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HANDICAPS WHICH THREATEN OTHERS
AND THE PROHIBITION OF
DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
REHABILITATION ACT*
Stephen L. Mikochik**
I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper will explore whether persons whose handicaps constitute a potential threat to others are in any measure protected by
federal law from discrimination in employment. After reviewing the
evolution of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,' the principal federal safeguard for handicapped workers, this paper will specifically examine whether alcoholics, drug addicts, and carriers of
contagious diseases, like Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(hereinafter "AIDS"), are included within the statute's coverage. In
that regard, this paper will review the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline2 which required
federally funded employers to explore ways of safely accomodating
workers handicapped with infectious diseases before discharging
them. This paper will close by examining the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 19871 in which Congress effectively codified the Arline
4

II.

BACKGROUND

Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 19735 (hereinafter the

"Act") was the first federal legislation to recognize the employment
* Associate Professor, Temple University School of Law. B.A., New York University;
J.D., Fordham Law School; LL.M. Harvard Law School.
** I acknowledge the support for this paper provided by Temple University School of
Law with special appreciation to Barbara Berreski, Vika Gardner, and Elizabeth K. Maurer.
I. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (current
version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1988)).
2. 480 U.S. 273, reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987).
3. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 60-78 (discussing the Arline decision).
5. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, 390-94 (current version
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 790-94 (Supp. 1988)).
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rights of disabled persons. Section 501(b)6 of the Act requires the
federal government to take affirmative action in the hiring and advancement of handicapped individuals. 7 Section 503(a) 8 places a

similar duty on employers in carrying out contracts with the federal
government in excess of $2500.9 Section 504,10 the broadest and un-

doubtedly the most litigated of the three provisions, protects qualified handicapped individuals from discrimination solely on the basis
6. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 501(b), 87 Stat. 355, 390
(current version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (Supp. 1988)), provides that:
Each department, agency and instrumentality (including the United States Postal
Service and the Postal Rate Commission) in the executive branch shall, within one
hundred and eighty days after. . . [September 26, 1973], submit to the Civil Service Commission and to the Committee an affirmative action program plan for the
hiring, placement, and advancement of handicapped individuals in such department,
agency, or instrumentality. Such plan shall include a description of the extent to
which and methods whereby the special needs of handicapped employees are being
met. Such plan shall be updated annually, and shall be reviewed annually and approved by the Commission, if the Commission determines, after consultation with
the Committee, that such plan provides sufficient assurances, procedures and commitments to provide adequate hiring, placement, and advancement opportunities for
handicapped individuals.
7. See id.
8. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 503(a), 87 Stat. 355, 393
(current version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. 1988)) provides:
Any contract in excess of $2,500 entered into by any Federal department or agency
for the procurement of personal property and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States shall contain a provision requiring that, in employing persons to carry out such contract the party contracting with the United States
shall take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals as defined in section 7(6) [of this title]. The provisions of this
section shall apply to any subcontract in excess of $2,500 entered into by a prime
contractor in carrying out any contract for the procurement of personal property
and nonpersonal services (including construction) for the United States. The President shall implement the provisions of this section by promulgating regulations
within ninety days after

. .

. [September 26, 1973].

9. See id.
10. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (current version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1988)), provides:
No otherwise qualified individual with handicaps in the United States, as defined in
section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or
under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United
States Postal Service. The head of each such agency shall promulgate such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the amendments to this section made by the
Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Act of
1978. Copies of any proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate authorizing committees of the Congress, and such regulation may take effect no earlier than
the thirtieth day after the date on which such regulation is so submitted to such
committees.
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of their handicap in programs receiving federal financial assistance."1
Title V grew out of an attempt by Representative Vanik and
Senators Humphrey and Percy to amend Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 196412 in order to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
handicap.13 The legislative history surrounding the enactment of Title V is quite sparse, due to the confusion caused by President Nixon

vetoing the Rehabilitation Act twice for reasons dealing with the
breadth of certain grant provisions.

4

Nevertheless, in sponsoring the

predecessor bill, Senator Humphrey indicated that his legislation
would address not only formal exclusion but also practices that were
exclusionary in effect. 15
A year after enactment, Congress returned to the Rehabilitation
Act to make several technical changes.10 The original definition of
"handicapped individual," applicable to all of the Act's provisions
including Title V, was limited to persons with substantial handicaps
in regard to employment, who could likely benefit from vocational
rehabilitation services.17 Given that Title V also covered handicapped persons already capable of employment 18 and that section
11.

See id.

12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1982).
13. See 119 CONG. REC. 18137 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Vanik); 118 CONG. REc. 525
(1972) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 118 CONG. REc. 526 (1972) (statement of Sen. Percy);
118 CONG. Rsc. 3210 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); 117 CONG. REc. 45974 (1971)
(remarks of Rep. Vanik).
14. S. Rep. No. 318, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1973).
15. 118 CONG. REC. 525 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Senator Humphrey recognized that the denial of equal opportunity to handicapped persons did not always result from
prejudice but was frequently caused by "problems of transportation and architectural barriers." Id. But, he concluded, whatever the explanation for excluding handicapped persons, "the
injustice of exclusion remains." Id.
16. See generally Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88
Stat. 1617.
17. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7, 87 Stat. 355, 359 (current
version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (Supp. 1988)). This original definition of "handicapped individual" included any person who:
(A) has a physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or resuits in a substantial handicap to employment and (B) can reasonably be expected
to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation services provided
pursuant to titles I and III of this Act.
S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1974). Section 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped individuals regardless of their need for, or ability to benefit from, vocational rehabilitation services, in relation to Federal assistance in employment,
housing, transportation, education, health services or any other Federally aided programs.
18. See S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1974). This report stated that "[i]t
was clearly the intent of the Congress in adopting section 503 . . . and section 504 . . . that
the term 'handicapped individual' in those sections was not narrowly limited to employment [in
the case of section 504], nor to the individual's potential to benefit from vocational rehabilitation services under titles I and III [in the case of both sections 503 and 504] of the Act." Id.
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504 specifically covered more than just federal fund recipients' emof "handiployment practices,"" a new and much broader definition
20
capped individual" was added for purposes of Title V.
Congress also recognized that it had not formally authorized
implementing regulations for section 504.21 Nevertheless, Congress
called upon federal funding agencies, especially the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (hereinafter "HEW") to develop
regulations promptly.2 Unfortunately, none were issued for several
years due in part to the complexity of developing appropriate rules
for accommodating the widely varied needs of disabled persons. 23 In
1976, after a lawsuit was filed to force promulgation of regulations,24
President Ford issued Executive Order 11,914,25 requiring all federal
19. S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1974). Section 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination against all individuals regardless of their need for, or ability to benefit
from, vocational reahabilitation services in relation to Federal assistance in employment, housing, transportation, education, health services, or any other Federally aided programs. id.
20. The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88
Stat. 1617, 1619 (amending Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7, 87 Stat. 355, 359) amended the definition of "handicapped individual" in order to include:
any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities, (B) has a record of such impairment, or (C) is regarded as having such an impairment.
21. See S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1974). "[Section 504] does not
specifically require the issuance of regulations or expressly provide for enforcement procedures,
but it is clearly mandatory in form, and such regulations and enforcement are intended." Id.
22. Id. at 40. "The Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
because of that Department's experience in dealing with handicapped persons and with the
elimination of discrimination in other areas, should assume responsibility for coordinating the
section 504 enforcement effort.
... Id.
23. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae before the Supreme Court, University of Texas v. Comenisch, at 20, n.10 (Oct. Term 1980) (No. 80-317), stating that:
It is our understanding that the issuance of the section 504 regulations was delayed,
not because HEW did not believe such regulations should be issued, but because
development of the regulations was a difficult and time consuming process. See 39
Fed. Reg. 18582 (1974); 41 Fed. Reg. 20296 (1976); and 41 Fed. Reg. 29548
(1976) .

...

24. See Cherry v. Matthews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C. 1976) (requesting promulgation
of regulations).
25. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976). The Executive Order provides
in pertinent part:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare shall coordinate the implementation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as
amended, hereinafter referred to as section 504, by all Federal departments and
agencies empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity. The Secretary shall establish standards for determining who are handicapped
individuals and guidelines for determining what are discriminatory practices, within
the meaning of section 504. The Secretary shall assist Federal departments and
agencies to coordinate their programs and activities and shall consult with such departments and agencies, as necessary, so that consistent policies, practices, and procedures are adopted with respect to the enforcement of section 504.
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funding agencies to develop section 504 implementing regulations.

HEW was designated as the lead agency for coordinating federal
implementation and was authorized to issue guidelines on what
would constitute discrimination and who would be considered handicapped persons under section 504.26

HEW finally issued implementing regulations in 1977 governing
its own grantees.17 These regulations prohibit recipients from discriminating in the terms, conditions, or privileges of their employment against qualified handicapped persons.2 8 Recipients are also required to make reasonable accommodations to the known handicaps
of employees unless they can-demonstrate that the accomodations
would impose an undue hardship.29 In 1978, HEW issued substantially similar guidelines for federal funding agencies to follow when
developing their own regulations."
That same year, Congress passed several amendments relating
to the enforcement of section 504.31 The definition of "handicapped
individual" was amended to address whether alcoholics and drug ad-

dicts were protected from employment discrimination under the
Act. 2 The application by HEW of the administrative enforcement
procedures under Title VI to section 50433 claims was statutorily
codified3 4 and attorney's fees were authorized for prevailing parties,
SECTION 2. In order to implement the provisions of section 504, each Federal
department and agency empowered to provide Federal financial assistance shall issue rules, regulations, and directives, consistent with the standards and procedures
established by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Id.
26. See id.
27. 45 C.F.R. Part 84 (1977).
28. Id. at § 84.11.
29. Id. at § 84.12.
30. 45 C.F.R. §§ 85.1-85.99 (1978).
31. Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955.
32. The Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122(a)(6), (8), 92 Stat. 2955, 2984-85 (amending Pub.
L. No. 43-112, §7, 87 Stat. 355, 359), provides that, for purposes of 503 and 504 as they
relate to employment the term "handicapped individual:"
does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use
of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in
question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse,
would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others.
33. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.61 (1977).
34. See Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2), Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 120, 92 Stat. 2955, 2982
(amending Pub. L. No. 93-112). These amendments established a new section 505(a)(2),
which provides that:
The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
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other than the United States, in Title V actions.35 In addition, Congress amended section 504 to insure that its nondiscrimination requirements applied to the federal government itself 38 With HEW's
dissolution in 1980, the responsibility for the coordination of section
504 was generally transferred to the U.S. Attorney General.37 Coordination of employment discrimination coverage under the Act, however, had vested in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(hereinafter "EEOC") two years earlier as a result of Executive Order 12,067.8

Finally, with the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, passed
in reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v.
Bell.39 Congress expanded the extent to which programs receiving
federal financial assistance were covered under section 504 and other
civil rights statutes."0 Additionally, the definition of "handicapped
1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000(d) et seq.] shall be available to any person aggrieved by any
act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal assistance or Federal provider of
such assistance under section 794 of this title.
Id.
35. See Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilites Amendments of 1978, 29 U.S.C. § 794a(b), Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 120, 92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (amending Pub. L. No. 93-112) These amendments established a new section 505(b), which provides
that "[iln any action or proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." Id.
36. Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978, 29 U.S.C. § 794, Pub. L. No. 95-602, §§ 119, 122(d)(2), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982,
2987 (amending Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394).
37. Exec. Order No. 12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980).
38. Exec. Order No. 12,067, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,967 (1978).
39. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
40. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 504, 102 Stat. 28,
29-30 (1988) (current version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (Supp. 1988)), provides in
pertinent part:
For the purposes of this section [504], the term "program or activity" means all of the
operations of(1)(A) a department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State
or of a local government; or
(B) the entity of such State or local government that distributes such assistance and each
such department or agency (and each other State or local government entity) to which the
assistance is extended, in the case of assistance to a State or local government;
(2)(A) a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of
higher education; or
(B) a local educational agency (as defined in section 2891(12) of Title 20), system of
vocational education, or other school system;
(3)(A) an entire corporation, partnership, or other private organization, or an entire sole
proprietorship(i) if assistance is extended to such corporation, partnership, private organization, or
sole proprietorship as a whole; or
(ii) which is principally engaged in the business of providing education, health care,
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individual"4 was again amended, this time to address whether persons with contagious diseases were protected from employment discrimination under section 504.42
III.

HANDICAPPED INDIVIDUAL

As previously noted, the definition of "handicapped individual,"
applicable to section 504 when enacted, was geared to eligibility for
rehabilitation services.4 a Recognizing the inadequacy of this definition for section 504, which was intended to protect more than just
those in need of vocational training, 44 Congress added a new definition in the 1974 Rehabilitation Act Amendments, applicable to all of
housing, social services, or parks and recreation; or
(B) the entire plant or other comparable, geographically separate facility to which Federal financial assistance is extended, in the case of any other corporation, partnership, private
organization, or sole proprietorship; or
(4) any other entity which is established by two or more of the entities described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3); any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.
Id.
41. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7, 87 Stat. 355, 359 (current
version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (Supp.1988)), set forth the original definition of
"handicapped individual." See supra note 17 (setting forth text of the original definition); see
also supra notes 20 & 32 (setting forth amended versions of definition). A technical amendment in 1986 substituted "individual with handicaps" for the term "handicapped individual"
in both section 504, Pub. L. 99-506, § 103(d)(2)(B), § 1002(e)(4), 100 Stat. 1807, 1810, 1844
(1986), and the Rehabilitation Act's defintional provision. See Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-506, §§ 103(b), 103(d)(1), (d)(2)(B) (current version as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (Supp. 1988)). For clarity the text will continue to refer only to the
term "handicapped individual."
42. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, §9, 102 Stat. 28,
31-32 (1988) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 706 (Supp. 1988)), provides that:
For purposes of sections

. .

. [503] and [504] . . . as such sections relate to em-

ployment, . . . [the term individual with handicaps] does not include an individual
who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such
disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety of other
individuals or who, by reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is
unable to perform the duties of the job.
43. See supra notes 32 & 41 (discussing the definition of the term "handicapped individual" in greater detail).
44. S. Rep. No. 1297, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 37-38 (1974), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 9260. This Senate Report stated that:
A test of discrimination against a handicapped individual under section 504 should
not be couched either in terms of whether such individual's disability is a handicap
to employment, or whether such individual can reasonably be expected to benefit, in
terms of employment, from vocational rehabilitation services. Such a test is irrelevant to the many forms of potential discrimination covered by section 504.
Section 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped individuals regardless of their need for or ability to benefit from vocational rehabilitation services in relation to Federal assistance in employment, housing, transportation, education, health services, or any other Federally-aided programs.
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the provisions of Title V:
"handicapped individual" means . . . any person who
(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially
limits one or more of such person's major life activities,
(ii) has a record of such an impairment, or
(iii) is regarded as having such an impairment."5

The breadth of this definition presented HEW with difficult
problems in devising implementing regulations. Although denying
coverage to the aged, homosexuals, or those disadvantaged by socioeconomic status, 461 HEW ultimately concluded that alcoholism and
drug addiction were handicapping conditions under the Act.4
A.

Alcoholism and Drug Addiction

HEW initially requested a ruling from the Attorney General on
whether alcoholics and drug addicts must be included within its section 504 regulations. In a 1977 opinion,'4 8 Attorney General Bell responded to this request, stating that Congress had intended coverage
of these groups under the definition of "handicapped individual" in
the 1973 Rehabilitation Act and that no indication to the contrary
was evidenced in the expansive 1974 amendments.4 9 Furthermore,
45. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516, § 111(a), 88 Stat.
1617, 1619 (current version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (Supp. 1988)).
46. See 42 Fed. Reg. 22,686 (1977). The HEW rules and regulations provide a definition of a handicapped person that includes:
[S]pecific limitations on what persons are classified as handicapped under the regulation. The first of the three parts of the definition specifies that only physical and
mental handicaps are included. Thus, environmental, cultural, and economic disadvantage are not in themselves covered; nor are prison records, age, or homosexuality.
Of course, if a person who has any of these characteristics also has a physical or
mental handicap, the person is included within the definition of handicapped person.
Id.
47. Id. The Regulations set forth in the Federal Register note that:
The Secretary [of HEW] has carefully examined [whether to include alcoholics and
drug addicts within the coverage of regulations implementing section 504] and has
obtained a legal opinion from the Attorney General. That opinion concludes that
drug addiction and alcoholism are "physical or mental impairments" within the
meaning of section 7(6) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, and that
drug addicts and alcoholics are therefore handicapped for purposes of section 504 if
their impairment substantially limits one of their major life activities. The Secretary
therefore believes that he is without authority to exclude these conditions from the
definition.
Id.
48. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 12 (1977).
49. Id.
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alcoholism and drug addiction were squarely within the plain language of the statute since both conditions were generally considered
diseases that could substantially impair life activities. 50 The Attorney General, nevertheless, cautioned that, in his opinion, recognition
of alcoholics and drug addicts as handicapped persons did not necessarily entitle them to coverage since section 504 protected only
"qualified" handicapped persons:
[Olur conclusion that alcoholics and drug addicts are "handicapped individuals" for purposes of section 504 does not mean that
such a person must be hired. . . if the manifestations of his condition prevent him from effectively performing the job in question. . . A person's behavioral manifestations of a disability may
also be such that his employment . . . would be unduly disruptive
to others, and section 504 presumably would not require unrealistic
accommodations in such a situation.5 1
The Attorney General concluded by observing that:
In sum, the statute does not require the impossible. It does not unrealistically require that recipients of Federal . . .grants ignore all
the behavioral or other problems that may accompany a person's
alcoholism or drug addiction if they interfere with the performance
of his job. . . .At the same time, the statute requires that ...
grantees covered by the act not automatically deny employment
. ..to persons solely because they might find their status as alcoholics or drug addicts personally offensive, any more than .. .
grantees could discriminate against an individual who had some
other condition or disease-such as cancer, multiple sclerosis, amputation, or blindness-unless its manifestations or his conduct
rendered him ineligible. Between these two basic principles, there is
considerable latitude for formulating appropriate rules applicable
to specific cases. 52
In light of the Attorney General's opinion, the Secretary of
HEW concluded that "he [was] without authority to exclude . . .
[Alcoholics and drug addicts] from the definition [of 'handicapped
individual'] ;''53 but, as did the Attorney General, he qualified their
coverage under section 504:
[W]hile an alcoholic or drug addict may not be denied services or
disqualified from employment solely because of his or her condi50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
Id.
42 Fed. Reg. 22,686 (1977).
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tion, the behavioral manifestations of the condition may be taken
into account in determining whether he or she is qualified.
With respect to the employment of a drug addict or alcoholic,
if it can be shown that the addiction or alcoholism prevents successful performance of the job, the person need not be provided the
employment opportunity in question."

The reaction in Congress to the resulting regulations was
stormy. Several amendments were introduced to exclude alcoholics
and drug addicts from section 504 coverage. The version that was
adopted by the House, for example, would have excluded any alcoholic or drug addict "in need of rehabilitation." 55 Literally applied,
this proposed amendment would have permitted federally funded
programs, including those providing social services, to exclude even
those recovered alcoholics and drug addicts who required periodic
therapy to maintain their resolve. When the furor subsided, however,
56
the formula that Congress finally adopted was the Senate's version
which, as its supporters intended,57 virtually codified the Attorney
58
General's 1977 opinion.
B.

Contagious Diseases and the Arline Decision

HEW observed, in its 1977 regulations implementing section
54. Id. The Secretary of the HEW provided further guidance to federally-funded
employers:
[I]n making employment decisions, a recipient may judge addicts and alcoholics on
the same basis it judges all other applicants and employees. Thus, a recipient may
consider-for all applicants including drug addicts and alcoholics-past personnel
records, absenteeism, disruptive, abusive, or dangerous behavior, violations of rules
and unsatisfactory work performance. Moreover, employers may enforce rules
prohibiting the possession or use of alcohol or drugs in the work-place, provided that
such rules are enforced against all employees.
Id.
55. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1780, 95th Cong., 2d Sess, 102 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7375.
56. Id.
57. 124 CONG. REc. 30,323 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Williams); 124 CONG. REc. 30,324
(1978) (remarks of Sen. Hathaway); see also 124 CONG. Rac. 37,510 (1978) (remarks of Sen.
Williams).
58. The 1978 amendment as enacted provided that:
For purposes of sections.

.

.[503 and 504]

. .

. as such sections relate to employ-

ment, [the] term ["handicapped individual"] does not include any individual who is
an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents such
individual from performing the duties of the job in question or whose employment,
by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct threat to
property or the safety of others.
29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982) (current version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(c) (Supp.
1988)) (originally enacted as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7, 87 Stat.
355, 359).
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504, that there was "no flexibility within the statutory definition [of
'handicapped individual'] to limit the term to persons who have those
severe, permanent, or progressive conditions that are most commonly
regarded as handicaps."5 The Justice Department, however, recently argued in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline60 that
carriers of contagious diseases, like AIDS, who were yet asymptomatic were yet handicapped for purposes of section 504.61 In essence,
the government argued that, to be handicapped, individuals must be
perceived as having an impairment that substantially limits their life
activities. Contagiousness may affect others; it does not directly affect the carrier. Any restrictions on a carrier's employability or other
life activities, thus, results not from the carrier's infectious condition
but from the reaction of others to the carrier's status. Therefore,
contagiousness is not an "impairment" for purposes of the Act.
The Supreme Court in Arline did not address this specific question since the plaintiff, who had been discharged from her teaching
position at an elementary school due to a recurrence of tuberculosis,
had previously been hospitalized for that condition.6 2 Thus, along
with being actively contagious, she had "a record" of substantially
impairing symptoms and, therefore, was already a "handicapped individual" for purposes of the Act.6 3 The School Board argued that
the plaintiff's contagiousness and her history of symptoms were separate and that, by discharging her only for the former, it had not
discriminated on the basis of a handicapping condition. 64 The Court
rejected this contention,6 5 relying on reasoning which could ultimately be applied to suits brought by AIDS carriers. 6
The Court observed that, in prohibiting discrimination under
section 504, Congress recognized that prejudice against handicapped
persons could be as disabling as a handicapping condition itself. This
concern was reflected in the 1974 amended definition of "handicapped individual" which included persons merely perceived as having an impairing condition:
By amending the definition of "handicapped individual" to include
not only those who are actually physically impaired, but also those
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

42 Fed. Reg. 22,685-86 (1977).
480 U.S. 273, reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024 (1987).
Arline, 480 U.S. at 282 n.7.
See Arline, 480 U.S. 273.
Id. at 274.

64. Id. at 279.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 282 n.7.
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who are regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially limited in a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that
society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease
are as handicapping67 as are the physical limitations that flow from
actual impairment.
The Court further recognized that, historically, a most debilitating form of prejudice against handicapped persons was the unfounded fear of contagion:
Few aspects of a handicap give rise to the same level of public fear
and misapprehension as contagiousness. Even those who suffer or
have recovered from such noninfectious diseases as epilepsy or cancer have faced discrimination based on the irrational fear that they
might be contagious. The Act is carefully structured to replace
such reflexive reactions to actual or perceived handicaps with actions based on reasoned and medically sound judgments ...."
Although the definition of "handicapped individual" was sufficiently broad to include carriers of contagious diseases, the Court
nevertheless observed, as had the Attorney General in 1977 when he
addressed the inclusion of alcoholism and drug addiction, 69 that
"only those individuals who are both handicapped and otherwise
qualified are eligible for relief.' 7 0 The HEW regulations had defined
"'[q]ualified handicapped [individual]' . . . [wlith respect to employment, [to include] a handicapped person who, with reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the job in
question." 7' The first step that the Court identified in deciding
whether persons like Arline were qualified was to determine whether
their present condition posed an actual risk of contagion.7 2 Therefore, in order to protect handicapped persons "from deprivations
based on . . .unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to
such legitimate concerns of grantees as avoiding exposing others to
significant health risks,"73 the Supreme Court instructed lower
courts to make specific findings of fact:
based on reasonable medical judgments given the state of medical
knowledge, about (a) the nature of the risk (how the disease is
67. Id. at 283-84 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 284-85 (footnotes omitted).
69. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 12 (1977).
70. School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284, reh'g denied, 481 U.S.
1024 (1987).
71. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1986).
72. Arline, 480 U.S. at 281.
73. Id. at 287.
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transmitted), (b) the duration of the risk (how long is the carrier
infectious), (c) the severity of the risk (what is the potential harm
to third parties) and (d) the probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm."'
In addressing these factors, lower courts were required to defer
to the reasonable medical judgments of public health officials. 5 If an
actual risk was found, the next step identified by the Supreme Court
was to decide whether carriers could be accommodated without subjecting employers to undue hardship. 6 Arline was remanded with
directions to the district court to make additional findings on
whether the plaintiff was "otherwise qualified," including "whether
the School Board could have reasonably accommodated her" handicapping condition.78 To understand the Supreme Court's directions,
we must first examine what accommodations section 504 requires.
IV.

REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS

Section 504 prohibits intentional discrimination. If section 504
went no further, its utility would be greatly diminished since most of
the obstacles which handicapped persons face, like architectural or
communication barriers, are products of inadvertence rather than
animus. In sponsoring the antecedent to section 504, Senator
Humphrey indicated that his legislation would address not only formal exclusion, but also practices that were exclusionary in effect.79
Moreover, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress ratified the
inclusion of practices that were exclusionary in effect when it

adopted section

504.80

The more difficult question, concerns the breadth of the adverse
effects which section 504 was meant to prohibit. If recipients were
compelled to rid their programs of all obstacles to a handicapped
person's full participation, the resulting cost and disruption would be
considerable. Congress, however, endeavored to find a middle ground
between prohibiting only purposeful harm and overcoming all the effects of inadvertent harm.
At minimum, the statute requires federal fund recipients to af74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
Board of
(1987).

Id. at 288 (citation omitted).
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 289.
Id. at 288.
See supra note 13 (setting forth Senator Humphrey's remark regarding this bill).
See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 & n.13 (1984); see also School
Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282 & n.9, reh'g denied, 481 U.S. 1024
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ford handicapped persons "meaningful access" to their programs."1
Specifically, recipients have the affirmative duty to provide handicapped persons with effective methods for participating in the benefits of their programs."2 This does not mean that recipients must
make fundamental changes or take excessively burdensome steps to
accommodate a handicapped individual. 83 Such requirements would
constitute what the Supreme Court has considered to be "affirmative
action" beyond the duty to avoid discrimination that is imposed by
section 504.84 The Court, nevertheless, has observed "that the line

between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination against handicapped persons [will not] always . . .be

clear."8' 5 Moreover, it has acknowledged that "[i]dentification of
those instances where a refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person amounts to discrimination

. . .

continues to be an im-

portant responsibility of HEW."8 "
In its implementing regulations, HEW construed "meaningful
access" 17 to require that recipients "make reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise
qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program."88 The regulations illustrate the
types of accommodations required, including removal of architectural barriers and "job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, the
provision of readers or interpreters, and other similar actions." 8 The
regulations further set forth factors to be considered in determining
81. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300-01, (citing Southeastern Community College v Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979)),
Davis thus struck a balance between the statutory rights of the handicapped to be

integrated into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees in preserving
the integrity of their programs. While a grantee need not be required to make
"fundamental" or "substantial" modifications to accomodate the handicapped, it
may be required to make reasonable ones.

The balance struck in Davis requires that an otherwise qualified handicapped
individual must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee
offers.
82. See Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 n.17.
83. See Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 410-13 (1979). See
also Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 n.ll; Alexander, 469 U.S. at 299-301.

84. Davis, 442 U.S. at 411 n. 11; see also Alexander, 469 U.S. at 300 n.20.
85.

Davis, 442 U.S. at 412.

86. Id. at 413.
87.

See supra note 22.

88. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1986).
89. Id. § 84.12(b)(2).
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whether the provision of any accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on a recipient:
(1) the overall size of the recipient's program with respect to number of employees, number and type of facilities, and size of budget;
(2) the type of the recipient's operation, including the composition
and structure of the recipient's workforce; and
(3) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed.9"
Although transferring a disabled worker to another position was
not a required accommodation, the Court in Arline, nevertheless observed that "alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer's existing policies" could not be denied on
the basis of handicap. 91 Before assessing the impact of Arline on legal protections for those with contagious conditions like AIDS, it
must first be determined to what extent Congress has subsequently
limited that decision's force.
V.

THE CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO ARLINE

Congress responded to Arline in 1988 by amending the term
"handicapped individual," to clarify9 2 that:
For the purpose of sections [503] . ..and [504] .. .as such sections relate to employment, such term does, not include an individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by
reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat
to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the
currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the
duties of the job.93
Senators Humphrey and Harkin sponsored this provision as a floor
amendment to Senate Bill 55794 which ultimately became the Civil
Rights Restoration Act. 95 Although the legislative history surround90. Id. § 84.12(c).
91. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288.
92. The purpose of this amendment was specifically identified by Congress as providing
"a clarification for otherwise qualified individuals with handicaps in the employment context."
134 CONG. REC. S256 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988).
93. 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(C) (Supp. 1988). This definition was amended as the result of
The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32
(1988).
94. 134 CONG. REC. S256 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988).
95. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
After passing the Senate, during 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988), S557, which ultimately became
the Civil Rights Restoration Act, was adopted unamended by the House. 134 CONG. REC.
H565 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988). President Reagan subsequently vetoed the legislation. 134
CONG. REc. H917 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1988). Congress overrode the President's veto on March
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ing enactment of this amendment is sparse, consisting primarily of a
brief colloquy between the sponsors, 96 two points are clear: first, the
sponsors disagreed on the effect which their legislation would have,
(Senator Humphrey assumed that the amendment would restrict
section 504 coverage of contagious conditions97 while Senator Harkin
believed it would serve merely to clarify existing law as announced in
Arline"8 ), and second, both sponsors expressly intended to model
their legislation on the 1978 alcoholism and drug addiction amendment. " Thus, a proper understanding of that amendment is critical
to the analysis.
As previously noted, 100 the 1978 amendment was meant to codify existing law as set forth in the Attorney General's 1977 opinion 10 ' which made clear that, although alcoholic or drug addicted
employees were handicapped for purposes of section 504, they could
be outside the Act's protection if not otherwise qualified for employment because their conditions rendered them disruptive or ineffective. 101 Nonetheless the Attorney General concluded that alcoholics
and drug addicts were entitled to the same protection as persons
with more traditional handicaps. Thus, alcoholics and drug addicts,
like those with "cancer, multiple sclerosis, amputation, or blindness"
could not be automatically denied employment based on their handicapped status "unless its manifestations . . . rendered" them un-

qualified. 03 In determining whether employees were "otherwise
22, 1988. 134

CONG.

REc. H1072, S2765 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1988).

96. See 134 CONG. REc. S256-57 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988). In addition, Senators
Humphrey and Wilson made brief statements immediately prior to the Senate's consideration
of the amendment, 134 CONG. REc. S254-55 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988); and Senators
Humphrey and Harkin, along with Senators Inouye, Cranston, Kennedy, and Weicker, clarified their positions in statements made subsequent to the amendment's enactment. See 134
CONG. REc. S970 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 134 CONG. REc.
S1738 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Sen. Harkin); 134 CONG. REc. 5321 (daily ed.
Feb. 1, 1988) (statement of Sen. Inouye); 134

CONG.

REC. S723 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988)

(statement of Sen. Cranston); 134 CONG. REC. S1738 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statements of
Sen. Kennedy and Sen. Weicker).
97. 134 CONG. REC. S1970 (daily ed Feb. 18, 1988); 134 CONG. REc. S254-55 (daily
ed. Jan. 28, 1988); see also 134 CONG. REC. S255 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988) (statement of
Sen. Wilson).
98. 134 CONG. REC. S1738 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988); see also 134 CONG. REc. S738
(daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988); 134 CONG. REC. S723 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988).
99. See 134 CONG. REC. S256-57 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988) (Humphrey-Harkin collo-

quy); see also 134 CoNG. REc. S1738 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statement of Sen. Harkin);
134 CONG. REC. S970 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).

100. See supra notes 47-49 accompanying text.
101. 124 CONG. REC. S30,323 (1978); 124 CONG. REc. S37,510 (1978).
102.
103.

43 Op. Att'y Gen. 12 (1977).
Id.
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qualified,"' 1 4 employers were required to take reasonable steps to accommodate their more traditional handicapping conditions; 0 5 a similar requirement was evidently expected when the handicaps were alcoholism or drug addiction. 06
It was precisely this requirement that the Supreme Court ap-

plied to contagious conditions in Arline.10 7 Affirming that "only
those individuals who are both handicapped and otherwise qualified
are eligible for relief,"'' 08 the Court further observed:
In the employment context, an otherwise qualified person is one
who can perform "the essential functions" of the job in question. . . . When a handicapped person is not able to perform the
essential functions of the job, the court must also consider whether
any "reasonable accommodation" by the employer would enable
the handicapped person to perform those functions. 0 9
Thus, by modeling the treatment of contagious conditions after that

afforded alcoholism and drug addiction as evidenced, for example, by
the near identity of language between the 1978 and 1988 amendments,"10 Congress effectively applied the same standard set forth in
Arline to contagious conditions. Senator Humphrey's hopes notwith104. See supra Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 n.17.
105. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3)(1987). "'Qualified handicapped person' means: ... [w]ith
respect to postsecondary and vocational education services, a handicapped person who meets
the academic and technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the recipient's
education program or activity." Id. "A recipient shall make reasonable accommodation to the
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or employee unless the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the operation of its program." 45 C.F.R. 84.12(a) (1987).
106. 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 12 (1977). The Attorney General implicitly acknowledged this
point by observing that "section 504 presumably would not require unrealistic accommodations." Id. Thus, "realistic" accomodations were presumably required. See id.
107. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 n.17.
108. Arline, 480 U.S. at 285.
109. Id. at 288 n.17.
110. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 amended the term "individual with
handicaps" to exclude from section 504's protection against employment discrimination,
an individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason
of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or safety
of other individuals or who, by reason of the currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of the job.
Pub. L. No. 100-259, § 9, 102 Stat. 28, 31-32 (1988) (current version as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 706(8)(c) (Supp. 1988)). This language mirrors the 1978 amendment that excluded
from such coverage "any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of
alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in question or
whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would constitute a direct
threat to property or the safety of others." 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982) (as amended by
Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122(a)(6),(8), 92 Stat. 2955, 2984-85).
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standing,111 the 1988 amendment merely codified existing law.112
VI.

CONCLUSION

Handicaps do not divest persons of dignity and self-worth. By

adopting section 504, Congress recognized that even severely handicapped persons were entitled to take part in programs that their government financially supported and, moreover, that recipients of federal funds must reasonably seek to facilitate the participation of such
persons. By affirming that alcoholics and drug addicts were generally
covered under section 504,113 Congress further indicated that recipi11. It may be argued that consideration of accommodations is precluded by the 1988
amendment. If contagious conditions render persons ineffective or a direct threat to others,
they are not handicapped. Thus, the question whether they are qualified even with accommodations never arises. This apparently is what Senator Humphrey intended when he observed:
[A]s we stated in 1978 with respect to alcohol and drug abusers, . . . the two-step
process in section 504 applies in the situation under which it was first determined
that a person was handicapped and then it is determined that a person is otherwise
qualified.
134 CONG. REc. S25 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988); see also 134 CONG. REC. S970 (daily ed. Feb.
18, 1988) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); 134 CONG. REC. S257 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988)
(statement of Sen. Wilson).
The history of the 1978 amendment, however, makes no reference to any "two-step process in section 504." See Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, §§ 119, 122(d)(2), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982, 2987
(current version as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1988)). As discussed earlier, the
amendment was meant merely to insure that only "qualified" alcoholic or drug addicted employees were protected, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1780, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 102 (1978); and
nothing in its history would preclude consideration of accommodations in that regard. See
supra text accompanying notes 92-110 (discussing this). This was the approach which Senator
Harkin evidently intended when he agree that the 1988 amendment "does nothing to change
the current laws regarding reasonable accommodation as it applies to individuals with handicaps." 134 CONG. REc. S256 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1988) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); see also
134 CONG. REc. S1738 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1988) (statements of Senators Harkin, Kennedy,
and Weicker); 134 CONG. REc. S723 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1988) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
112. The U.S. Department of Justice has also reached the same conclusion, contending
that ". . . the Harkin-Humphrey amendment merely collapses the 'otherwise qualified' inquiry
applicable outside the employment context into the definition of 'individual with handicaps' in
the employment context." Justice Department: Memo on AIDS, Fair Employment Practices
Manual, 401: (BNA) 2021 at 2032 (1988). The department's Office of Legal Counsel concluded in a September 27, 1988 opinion letter to White House Counsel Arthur B. Culvahouse
that "the amendments legislative history convinces us that Congress intended that consideration of 'reasonable accommodation' should be factored into an employer's determination of
whether an infected employee poses a direct threat or can perform the job." Id. at 2033.
113. See Rehabilitation Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, § 122(a)(6),(8), 92 Stat. 2955, 2984-85 (amended
version at 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1982)). For purposes of §§ 503 and 504 as they relate to
employment, the term "handicapped individual":
does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use
of alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in
question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse,
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ents could not bar persons from federally funded programs simply
because of social reproach towards what were essentially handicapping conditions. These concerns prompted the Arline Court not to
exclude contagious persons from section 504 coverage and to measure their level of participation in funded programs against a medical standard.114
Nothing in the statute, however, requires recipients to ignore
illegal or disruptive conduct related to a handicapping condition. For
example, the Attorney General observed that section 504 would not
prevent application to alcoholics and drug addicts of "reasonable,
generally applicable rules of conduct . . . such as proscriptions

against the possession or use of drugs or alcohol" at the workplace,115 and the statute has been consistently construed to leave
prohibitions of homosexuality as it finds them.11
It is equally clear that section 504 does not require recipients to
expose others to any appreciable risk of harm in order to accommodate handicapped persons. Observing that "where reasonable accommodation does not overcome the effects of a person's handicap,...
failure to hire .
discrimination ...

. .

the handicapped person will not be considered
,"117 the Arline Court concluded that "[t]he Act

would not require a school board to place a teacher with active, contagious tuberculosis in a classroom with elementary school children."" 18 Hopefully, agency regulations drafted with sensitivity to
the concerns of carriers and those with whom they interact can strike
an appropriate balance between the need to shield program participants from exposure to more than a de minimis risk of contagion
while protecting carriers from warrantless discrimination.

would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others.

Id.
114.

School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284-86, reh'g denied, 481

U.S. 1024 (1987).
115.
116.

43 Op. Att'y Gen. 12 (1977).
Compare 42 Fed. Reg. 22686 (1977) with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186

(1986) (holding that a state law criminalizing sodomy did not violate substantive due process
requirements).
117. Arline, 480 U.S. at 288 n.17 (citing 45 C.F.R. Part 84, app. A at 315 (1985)).
118.

Id. at n.16.
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